Analyses / Impact Analysis / 119 · SJRES 139 Impact Analysis

119-SJRES-139 Data-Driven Journalist Impact Analysis

119 · SJRES 139 A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Environmental Protection Agency relating to "Air Plan Disapproval; Colorado; Regional Haze Plan for the Second Implementation Period".

Bottom-line assessment
Bottom‑line judgment (analytical, not advocacy).
Colorado Class I areas covered by SIP
12
Rocky Mountain NP 2024 visits
4154349visits
Rocky Mountain NP 2024 visitor spending
587.882$M
Rocky Mountain NP 2024 total economic output
861.831$M
Published
01 May 2026
Updated
01 May 2026
Tags
Impact Analysis · Regional Haze · CRA
Unvetted
01 · Section

Summary

What the resolution does and why it matters.

S.J.Res. 139 would use the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to disapprove EPA’s final rule that fully disapproved Colorado’s 2022 Regional Haze SIP for the second implementation period. Disapproval rescission would remove the immediate basis for a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) under Clean Air Act §110(c) and would, by CRA, bar EPA from issuing a rule in “substantially the same form” absent new legislation—introducing longer-run policy lock-in. (regulations.justia.com)

Analytically, passage would likely: (1) reduce near-term compliance costs/uncertainty for affected facilities by averting a FIP; (2) shift more responsibility to the state plan for visibility progress at Colorado’s 12 Class I areas; and (3) trade potential economic relief for forgone or delayed visibility and public-health co-benefits associated with deeper SO2/NOx/PM2.5 controls. (regulations.justia.com)

Procedural note: On April 29, 2026, the Senate rejected a motion to proceed to S.J.Res. 139 (46–52). This analysis nevertheless evaluates expected impacts if the resolution were enacted. (senate.gov)

02 · Section

Economic Effects

Direct and second-order effects on firms, workers, ratepayers, and gateway economies.

  • Regulatory exposure: Rescinding EPA’s disapproval would remove the immediate pathway to a FIP under 42 U.S.C. §110(c), lowering short‑run compliance risk for sources that could otherwise face federally imposed controls specific to visibility. (regulations.justia.com)
  • State plan reliance: With the state SIP left as the operative framework, utilities and industrial sources would plan against Colorado’s measures and timelines rather than potential federal backstops—typically reducing financing and retrofit uncertainty. (regulations.justia.com)
  • Coal‑community employment and local tax base: Operating horizons closer to Colorado’s plan could slow job losses and fiscal shocks in host communities (e.g., Pueblo, Craig, Hayden). For context, Comanche Unit 3 supports ~77 onsite jobs with ~$11.2M in annual wages; the state’s Just Transition/OEDIT programs have provided ~$9.6M in grants to help diversifying local economies. (coloradosun.com)
  • Tourism/gateway economies: Visibility is a core amenity for Colorado parks. In 2024, Rocky Mountain National Park hosted ~4.15M visits tied to ~$588M in visitor spending and ~$862M in total economic output in surrounding communities—exposure that could benefit from improved vistas but could also persist under current trends if progress slows. (npshistory.com)
  • Ratepayer implications: Avoided near‑term federal control mandates would likely temper upward pressure on rates; however, extended operation of older units can entail fuel/maintenance costs and future compliance risks not eliminated by CRA (uncertain net direction, depends on utility portfolios and timing).
03 · Section

Social Effects

Distributional impacts across workers, communities, and visitors.

  • Workers in coal‑reliant communities (Pueblo, Yampa Valley) could see a more gradual employment transition if the state plan’s closure/conversion timelines govern, while state Just Transition support remains pivotal to mitigate dislocation. (oedit.colorado.gov)
  • Public health co‑benefits could be smaller than under a stricter federal backstop: additional SO2/NOx controls reduce secondary PM2.5, which EPA’s Integrated Science Assessment links causally to mortality and cardiovascular effects; smaller emission cuts imply smaller co‑benefits. (epa.gov)
  • Visitors and gateway communities gain from clear‑air amenities; slower visibility improvement may diminish experiential quality at the margin in high‑use parks, but effects depend on baseline trends and wildfire smoke—factors outside the SIP’s scope. (nps.gov)
04 · Section

Environmental Effects

Expected changes to visibility outcomes and related pollutants.

  • Program goal and scope: The Regional Haze Rule targets visibility in 156 Class I areas with periodic SIPs (first due 2007; subsequent revisions due 2021, 2028, then every 10 years). Colorado’s second planning period covers 2019–2028. (epa.gov)
  • Colorado resources at stake: The state’s SIP addresses 12 in‑state Class I areas (e.g., Rocky Mountain NP, Maroon Bells–Snowmass, Weminuche). The state—not EPA—would remain primarily responsible for reasonable progress goals under CRA disapproval of EPA’s rule. (hermes.cde.state.co.us)
  • Mechanism: Regional haze is driven by fine particles (sulfate from SO2, nitrate from NOx, organic/elemental carbon, fine soil) that scatter/absorb light; visibility change is tracked using the deciview metric via the IMPROVE algorithm. (nps.gov)
  • Trajectory: If EPA cannot impose a replacement FIP, visibility improvements would follow Colorado’s selected measures. Compared to a hypothetical, more stringent FIP, expected deciview improvement by 2028 could be smaller (directional inference; magnitude depends on specific controls foregone). (regulations.justia.com)
Pollutant/precursor Primary visibility pathway Typical contributing sources
SO2 → sulfate (PM2.5) Light scattering (sulfate aerosol) Coal-fired EGUs, industrial boilers
NOx → nitrate (PM2.5) Light scattering (nitrate aerosol) EGUs, engines, industrial combustion
Organic/elemental carbon (PM2.5) Scattering/absorption Combustion, wildland fire, industry
Fine soil/dust Scattering Construction, natural dust
05 · Section

Temporal Analysis

Short‑term versus long‑term outcomes if S.J.Res. 139 were enacted.

  1. Near term (through 2026–2028): EPA’s disapproval would be null; FIP risk recedes; sources continue planning under Colorado’s SIP timelines; compliance spending likely deferred or reduced versus a FIP scenario. (regulations.justia.com)
  2. Medium term (late‑2020s to early‑2030s): Visibility progress depends on execution of state measures and scheduled unit closures/conversions; EPA noted Colorado’s SIP did not independently evaluate broader grid‑reliability issues for 13 closures—posing potential schedule risks. (regulations.justia.com)
  3. Long term (to 2064 national goal): If state‑level measures are less stringent than a potential federal plan, cumulative deciview improvement may lag, requiring steeper reductions in later periods to meet the “natural visibility” benchmark. (pca.state.mn.us)
06 · Section

Unintended Consequences and Risks

Second‑order or policy‑design effects to monitor.

  • Litigation/uncertainty: Parties seeking stricter visibility measures may litigate adequacy of the state plan, extending uncertainty for sources and communities (historical pattern in haze SIPs).
  • Reliability trade‑offs: EPA flagged Colorado’s lack of an independent grid‑reliability assessment for 13 planned closures; if closures slip to maintain reliability, environmental gains may be delayed; if they proceed, local labor/tax impacts may accelerate. (regulations.justia.com)
  • Interprogram interactions: Haze controls can deliver PM2.5 health co‑benefits; weaker emission reductions today can raise the stringency (and cost) needed in later SIP cycles to reach the long‑run visibility target. (epa.gov)
07 · Section

Assessment

Bottom‑line judgment (analytical, not advocacy).

Overall stance: Neutral. The resolution would lower near‑term regulatory/compliance risk for covered sources and may moderate immediate labor/tax shocks in coal‑reliant communities, but at the potential cost of slower or less‑certain visibility progress and smaller public‑health co‑benefits relative to a hypothetical federal plan. Net impacts hinge on Colorado’s execution of its SIP and on external drivers (wildfire smoke, demand growth, reliability constraints). (regulations.justia.com)

08 · Section

Key Metrics

Contextual indicators for scale and stakes.

Colorado Class I areas covered by SIP
12
Rocky Mountain NP 2024 visits
4154349visits
Rocky Mountain NP 2024 visitor spending
587.882$M
Rocky Mountain NP 2024 total economic output
861.831$M
Jobs supported by Rocky Mountain NP visits (2024)
5421jobs
Senate motion to proceed (Apr 29, 2026)
46Yea (52 Nay)

Sources: NPS Visitor Spending Effects 2024 (park‑level table), Colorado SIP Class I inventory, and official Senate roll‑call. (npshistory.com)

09 · Section

Sourcing

Primary documents and methods relied upon.

  • EPA final rule: Air Plan Disapproval; Colorado; Regional Haze Plan for the Second Implementation Period (91 FR 3048–3056, Jan 26, 2026). Used for rule substance, statutory cites (CAA §110(c)), and EPA’s rationale. (regulations.justia.com)
  • EPA guidance: 2019 Guidance for second‑period Regional Haze SIPs. Used for program timing/methods. (epa.gov)
  • CRA mechanics and “substantially the same” prohibition: GAO FAQs and CRS FAQ. (gao.gov)
  • Regional Haze Program overview and timelines. (epa.gov)
  • Visibility metric and pollutant pathways (deciview/IMPROVE). (nps.gov)
  • Long‑run target (natural visibility by ~2064). (pca.state.mn.us)
  • Colorado Class I areas inventory (state SIP archive/BLM references). (hermes.cde.state.co.us)
  • Rocky Mountain NP 2024 economic contributions (visits, spending, jobs, output). (npshistory.com)
  • Colorado Just Transition/OEDIT program funding context. (oedit.colorado.gov)
  • Community employment context at Comanche 3 (Pueblo). (coloradosun.com)
  • Senate Roll Call Vote No. 110 (Apr 29, 2026) on motion to proceed. (senate.gov)

Discussion