Analyses / Impact Analysis / 119 · SJRES 88 Impact Analysis

119-SJRES-88 Corporate Impact Analysis

119 · SJRES 88 A joint resolution terminating the national emergency declared to impose global tariffs.

public Foreign Trade and International Finance
This joint resolution terminates the national emergency declared by President Donald J. Trump on April 2, 2025, which imposed a 10% tariff on most imports to the United States and additional duties...
Bottom-line assessment
Stance reflects an analytical balance of compliance costs, competitive dynamics, and macro distributional effects.
Senate action
51yea votes (47 nay) on Oct. 30, 2025
Tariff pass‑through
100percent to import prices (approx.)
Farm export losses (retaliation, 2018–2019)
27billion USD
Section 232 tariffs (context)
50percent on steel/aluminum as of June 2025
Published
13 Nov 2025
Updated
13 Nov 2025
Tags
Whipline · Impact Analysis · Trade
Unvetted
01 · Section

Summary

  • Scope: Terminates the April 2, 2025 national emergency invoked in Executive Order 14257 to impose global “reciprocal” tariffs; the Senate passed S.J.Res. 88 on October 30, 2025 (51–47). [2]Congress.gov — Text - S.J.Res.88 - 119th Congress (2025-2026)[1]Congress.gov — Actions - S.J.Res.88 - 119th Congress (2025-2026)
  • Mechanics: Under Section 202 of the National Emergencies Act, a joint resolution can terminate an emergency; upon enactment, authorities premised on that emergency cease. [3]Legal Information Institute (Cornell) — 50 U.S. Code § 1622 - National emergenc…
  • Policy interface: Termination would not alter tariffs grounded in other laws (e.g., Section 232 steel/aluminum, currently elevated), so some import costs persist. [8]White House — Adjusting Imports of Aluminum and Steel into the United States (J…
  • Baseline impacts: Past evidence shows near‑full pass‑through of tariffs to U.S. import prices and real‑income losses; rolling back emergency‑based tariffs likely lowers input costs, consumer prices, and compliance burdens, while reducing tariff revenue and protection for certain industries. [6]NBER — The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare
  • Risk context: Courts have questioned the legality of emergency‑based “across‑the‑board” tariffs under IEEPA; congressional termination would close that channel irrespective of litigation outcomes. [9]Reuters — Most Trump tariffs are not legal, U.S. appeals court rules
02 · Section

Economic Effects

Evidence is drawn from statutory sources, federal data, and empirical studies of recent U.S. tariff episodes; magnitudes below are directionally indicative where the proposal’s exact tariff schedule under EO 14257 is not fully reproduced in the bill text.

  • Import prices and inflation: 2018–2019 research finds essentially complete pass‑through of U.S. tariffs into import prices, reducing real income; removal of emergency‑based tariffs should relieve these price pressures. [6]NBER — The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare
  • Household purchasing power: Distributional modeling of 2025 tariffs shows short‑run regressivity (larger burden shares at the bottom of the income distribution); termination would reverse part of this effect. [7]Yale Budget Lab — Where We Stand: Fiscal, Economic, and Distributional Effects…
  • Downstream input costs and margins: Steel/aluminum and broad input tariffs raised costs for manufacturers and federal contractors; ending emergency‑based tariffs lowers bill-of-materials and bid prices, though Section 232 duties still bind. [10]U.S. Chamber of Commerce — How the Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Are Hurting U.S.…[8]White House — Adjusting Imports of Aluminum and Steel into the United States (J…
  • Agriculture and traded goods: Retaliatory tariffs during 2018–2019 cut U.S. farm exports by an estimated $27B over 18 months; terminating emergency‑based tariffs lowers retaliation risk and may support export recovery depending on counterpart actions. [11]USDA ERS (Amber Waves) — Retaliatory Tariffs Reduced U.S. States’ Exports of Ag…
  • Compliance and administrative burden: Firms sought thousands of product exclusions under prior tariffs; termination simplifies classification, licensing, and exclusion workflows tied to the emergency regime. [12]U.S. Government Accountability Office — Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: Commerce Sh…
  • Fiscal effects: Tariff revenues linked to the emergency would fall upon termination; the net macro effect depends on growth, prices, and any offsetting tax or spending changes. (General revenue point; no official CBO estimate is posted for S.J.Res. 88.) [1]Congress.gov — Actions - S.J.Res.88 - 119th Congress (2025-2026)
Senate action
51yea votes (47 nay) on Oct. 30, 2025
Tariff pass‑through
100percent to import prices (approx.)
Farm export losses (retaliation, 2018–2019)
27billion USD
Section 232 tariffs (context)
50percent on steel/aluminum as of June 2025

Sources for metrics: Congress.gov roll call and actions; Amiti–Redding–Weinstein (2019); USDA ERS (Amber Waves); White House proclamations on Section 232, June 2025. [1]Congress.gov — Actions - S.J.Res.88 - 119th Congress (2025-2026)[6]NBER — The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare[11]USDA ERS (Amber Waves) — Retaliatory Tariffs Reduced U.S. States’ Exports of Ag…[8]White House — Adjusting Imports of Aluminum and Steel into the United States (J…

03 · Section

Social Effects

  • Distributional burden: Modeling of 2025 tariffs indicates larger percentage income losses for lower‑income deciles relative to higher‑income households; termination would be progressive in the short run. [7]Yale Budget Lab — Where We Stand: Fiscal, Economic, and Distributional Effects…
  • Poverty incidence: Analysts project tariff‑induced price increases elevate measured poverty; removing emergency‑based tariffs likely mitigates those headwinds. [13]Web search · turn 2 #4
  • Regional exposure: Farm‑ and export‑reliant regions (Midwest, parts of the West and South) bore disproportionate costs during retaliation; reduced escalation risk benefits these communities, contingent on partner responses. [11]USDA ERS (Amber Waves) — Retaliatory Tariffs Reduced U.S. States’ Exports of Ag…
  • Workforce composition: Sectors shielded by emergency tariffs (e.g., certain basic materials or consumer‑goods assembly) could face renewed import competition, with localized employment effects absent transition support. (General inference grounded in 2018–2019 patterns.) [6]NBER — The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare
04 · Section

Environmental Effects

Trade policy interacts with emissions through transport, production location, and clean‑technology affordability.

  • Maritime transport: Expanded trade volumes modestly raise shipping activity; international shipping accounts for ~2.9% of global CO2 (2018). Termination that increases goods flows could marginally increase shipping‑related emissions absent efficiency gains. [14]International Maritime Organization — Decarbonization of shipping (Fourth IMO G…
  • Clean‑tech deployment: Historical evidence shows solar tariffs raised U.S. prices and reduced installations (e.g., an estimated 10.5 GW foregone under Section 201), implying that lower import barriers tend to accelerate deployment of renewables and associated emissions reductions. [15]SEIA — The High Cost of Tariffs (Section 201 solar)
  • Sectoral mix: If termination shifts output from domestic energy‑intensive manufacturing to imports, net emissions effects depend on relative carbon intensities; direction is ambiguous without product‑ and source‑specific data. (Evidence-informed uncertainty.)
05 · Section

Temporal Analysis

  1. Immediate (0–6 months): Removal of emergency‑based tariffs lowers landed costs and reduces administrative friction; some prices adjust quickly in tariffed categories; import volumes may spike, testing logistics capacity. [6]NBER — The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare
  2. Medium term (6–24 months): Export conditions improve if foreign retaliation is unwound; downstream manufacturers and government procurement see margin relief; protected industries may consolidate or seek alternate remedies (e.g., AD/CVD, safeguards). [11]USDA ERS (Amber Waves) — Retaliatory Tariffs Reduced U.S. States’ Exports of Ag…
  3. Long term (2+ years): Investment planning benefits from reduced legal and policy volatility around emergency‑based tariffs, though separate regimes (Section 232, 301, AD/CVD) remain material to costs and sourcing strategies. [8]White House — Adjusting Imports of Aluminum and Steel into the United States (J…
06 · Section

Unintended Consequences

07 · Section

Assessment

Stance reflects an analytical balance of compliance costs, competitive dynamics, and macro distributional effects.

Overall assessment: Favorable. Terminating the emergency would likely reduce economy‑wide compliance and input‑cost burdens linked to EO 14257 tariffs, ease regressive impacts on households, and lower retaliation risk, while leaving in place sectoral protections that policymakers can adjust separately. The main downside risks are concentrated in industries that benefited from emergency‑driven protection and in the fiscal loss of tariff revenue. Legal clarity is an added benefit amid active court challenges to emergency‑based tariffs. [6]NBER — The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare[7]Yale Budget Lab — Where We Stand: Fiscal, Economic, and Distributional Effects…[11]USDA ERS (Amber Waves) — Retaliatory Tariffs Reduced U.S. States’ Exports of Ag…[9]Reuters — Most Trump tariffs are not legal, U.S. appeals court rules

08 · Section

Sourcing

Core statutory and empirical references used above.

  • Bill text and status: Congress.gov. [2]Congress.gov — Text - S.J.Res.88 - 119th Congress (2025-2026)[1]Congress.gov — Actions - S.J.Res.88 - 119th Congress (2025-2026)
  • National Emergencies Act, termination mechanism: 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (LII). [3]Legal Information Institute (Cornell) — 50 U.S. Code § 1622 - National emergenc…
  • Executive Order 14257 context: White House memorandum clarifying exceptions; press reporting on April 2, 2025 announcement. [4]White House — Clarification of Exceptions Under Executive Order 14257 of April…[5]Washington Post — Trump announces 10 percent tariffs on all imports, additional…
  • Tariff price and welfare impacts: Amiti, Redding, Weinstein (2019, NBER). [6]NBER — The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare
  • Distributional effects: Yale Budget Lab (2025). [7]Yale Budget Lab — Where We Stand: Fiscal, Economic, and Distributional Effects…
  • Agricultural retaliation losses: USDA ERS (Amber Waves). [11]USDA ERS (Amber Waves) — Retaliatory Tariffs Reduced U.S. States’ Exports of Ag…
  • Downstream manufacturing costs: U.S. Chamber of Commerce (steel/aluminum). [10]U.S. Chamber of Commerce — How the Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Are Hurting U.S.…
  • Shipping emissions baseline: IMO Fourth GHG Study highlights. [14]International Maritime Organization — Decarbonization of shipping (Fourth IMO G…
  • Solar tariff impacts: SEIA analysis. [15]SEIA — The High Cost of Tariffs (Section 201 solar)
  • Legal status of IEEPA‑based tariffs: Reuters appellate coverage. [9]Reuters — Most Trump tariffs are not legal, U.S. appeals court rules
  • Context on separate Section 232 actions: White House proclamations, 2025. [8]White House — Adjusting Imports of Aluminum and Steel into the United States (J…
Sources cited
  1. [1] Actions - S.J.Res.88 - 119th Congress (2025-2026) Congress.gov
  2. [2] Text - S.J.Res.88 - 119th Congress (2025-2026) Congress.gov
  3. [3] 50 U.S. Code § 1622 - National emergencies (termination) Legal Information Institute (Cornell)
  4. [4] Clarification of Exceptions Under Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025 White House
  5. [5] Trump announces 10 percent tariffs on all imports, additional taxes for some 60 countries Washington Post
  6. [6] The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare NBER
  7. [7] Where We Stand: Fiscal, Economic, and Distributional Effects of 2025 Tariffs (Yale Budget Lab) Yale Budget Lab
  8. [8] Adjusting Imports of Aluminum and Steel into the United States (June 3, 2025) White House
  9. [9] Most Trump tariffs are not legal, U.S. appeals court rules Reuters
  10. [10] How the Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Are Hurting U.S. Manufacturing U.S. Chamber of Commerce
  11. [11] Retaliatory Tariffs Reduced U.S. States’ Exports of Agricultural Commodities USDA ERS (Amber Waves)
  12. [12] Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: Commerce Should Improve Its Exclusion Request Process U.S. Government Accountability Office
  13. [13] Web search · turn 2 #4
  14. [14] Decarbonization of shipping (Fourth IMO GHG Study highlights) International Maritime Organization
  15. [15] The High Cost of Tariffs (Section 201 solar) SEIA

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