Analyses / Impact Perspective / 119 · SJRES 88 Impact Perspective

119-SJRES-88 Blue Collar Impact Perspective

119 · SJRES 88 A joint resolution terminating the national emergency declared to impose global tariffs.

public Foreign Trade and International Finance
This joint resolution terminates the national emergency declared by President Donald J. Trump on April 2, 2025, which imposed a 10% tariff on most imports to the United States and additional duties...
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S.J.Res. 88 would end the April 2, 2025 national‑emergency tariff regime created by Executive Order 14257; it has passed the Senate and awaits House action. Ending the emergency would likely unwind the across‑the‑board “reciprocal” tariffs and related add‑ons (including duties…

— from my read of the bill
What I'm watching
17% of import value
Average U.S. tariff level under 2025 regime (est.)
1% price ↑ per 1% tariff
Importer pass‑through to prices (2018–21)
1.9% vs. no‑tariff baseline
Steel output gain from Section 232 (2021)
Published
13 Nov 2025
Updated
13 Nov 2025
Tags
trade · tariffs · manufacturing
Unvetted
01 · Section

Summary of my opinion

From a factory‑floor and union hall vantage point: this resolution pulls the plug on the emergency authority the White House used to slap global “reciprocal” tariffs. That would drop many of the new duties that have raised costs, but it would also remove the negotiating hammer that’s been shielding some mills and strategic supply chains. I view the bill unfavorably unless Congress replaces that leverage with hard, Made‑in‑America requirements and targeted, statutory trade tools that can’t be gamed. [2]Federal Register — Executive Order 14257 (Apr. 2, 2025) — Federal Register[1]Library of Congress — S.J.Res. 88 (Text) — Congress.gov

  • What it does: terminates the April 2, 2025 national emergency underpinning the reciprocal tariff regime; Senate passed it on October 30, 2025 and it’s now held at the House desk. [2]Federal Register — Executive Order 14257 (Apr. 2, 2025) — Federal Register[4]Library of Congress — S.J.Res. 88 — All Actions — Congress.gov
  • Why I care: jobs, pensions, and bargaining power in U.S. industry depend on stable orders, fair pricing, and real leverage against offshoring—not just cheaper imports next quarter.
02 · Section

Specific impacts on jobs, businesses, and prices

Net: mixed in the short run, risky in the long run without replacement guardrails.

Average U.S. tariff level under 2025 regime (est.)
17% of import value
Importer pass‑through to prices (2018–21)
1% price ↑ per 1% tariff
Steel output gain from Section 232 (2021)
1.9% vs. no‑tariff baseline
Annual farm‑export losses from 2018–19 retaliation
13.2$B/yr
  • Input‑cost relief for small and mid‑size manufacturers: With the emergency ended, many “reciprocal” add‑on tariffs would lift, easing pass‑through costs U.S. firms and consumers have been paying. Recent data show U.S. buyers absorbed most 2025 tariff costs, consistent with earlier research finding near‑full pass‑through. Expect some cooling in goods inflation. [5]Reuters — How the United States is eating Trump’s tariffs — Reuters[6]National Bureau of Economic Research — Amiti, Redding, Weinstein (2019), The Im…
  • Pressure on upstream producers: Broad shields go away. Prior evidence shows tariffs raised U.S. steel/aluminum prices and nudged domestic output up; removing blanket cover without targeted tools risks lost hours at mills and foundries. [7]U.S. International Trade Commission — USITC summary of 232 and 301 tariff effec…
  • Export breathing room: Less chance of fresh retaliation hitting farm and machinery exports if the U.S. steps back from global tariffs; past retaliation cost U.S. agriculture about $13.2B per year in 2018–19. [8]USDA ERS — USDA ERS: Retaliatory Tariffs Reduced U.S. States’ Ag Exports
  • Retail and e‑commerce dynamics: Ending the emergency would likely unwind tariff measures aimed at low‑value China parcels, reviving de minimis flows that hammer Main Street unless Congress fixes the loophole separately. [3]Federal Register — Executive Order 14259 (Apr. 8, 2025) — Federal Register
  • Legal certainty vs. leverage: Courts have already questioned using emergency powers for sweeping tariffs; a legislative termination clarifies authority but surrenders bargaining leverage unless Congress replaces it with durable, statute‑based tools (e.g., 232/301 reforms, anti‑de minimis). [9]Associated Press — Court finds tariffs an illegal use of emergency power, but l…
03 · Section

Social impact on communities I’m concerned about

Who wins and who loses if the emergency tariffs end?

  • Farm and rail towns: Reduced risk of retaliation is a plus for growers, grain handlers, and rail jobs tied to exports. We’ve seen how retaliation can slam soy, sorghum, and pork states. [8]USDA ERS — USDA ERS: Retaliatory Tariffs Reduced U.S. States’ Ag Exports
  • Mill towns and basic‑materials workers: Losing the temporary tariff wall without a replacement policy could cut shifts and weaken bargaining leverage in steel, aluminum, and primary metals. Evidence from earlier 232 actions shows tariffs buoyed output and prices; removing shields abruptly could sting. [7]U.S. International Trade Commission — USITC summary of 232 and 301 tariff effec…
  • Working‑class households: Cheaper imported inputs and goods would ease household budgets in the short run; studies of the 2018 rounds found the costs largely landed on U.S. consumers and firms. [6]National Bureau of Economic Research — Amiti, Redding, Weinstein (2019), The Im…
04 · Section

Environmental and sustainability effects

Tariffs have been a double‑edged sword for clean energy supply chains.

  • Lifting emergency‑tariff add‑ons should reduce near‑term prices on solar hardware and related components, supporting faster deployment and construction jobs—unless separate trade cases keep duties high. Prior industry analyses tied broad solar tariffs to lost jobs, investment, and delayed gigawatts. [10]Web search · turn 4 #0
05 · Section

Long‑term vs. short‑term

Short term, prices ease; long term, the risk is losing reshoring momentum.

  • Short term: input‑cost and inflation relief helps shops make payroll, bid contracts, and keep apprentices on. [5]Reuters — How the United States is eating Trump’s tariffs — Reuters
  • Long term: if we end the emergency without passing targeted, worker‑first industrial policy (Buy America with teeth, domestic‑content rules, pension‑safe apprenticeships, and snap‑back tariffs against cheaters), we invite another wave of offshoring and price undercutting that hollows out wages and union power.
06 · Section

Unintended consequences and legal wrinkles

07 · Section

Bottom line: Favorable, unfavorable, or neutral?

Unfavorable.

I’m against S.J.Res. 88 as written. Yes, the emergency tariffs raised prices on our side of the fence—but ripping them out without a replacement plan weakens U.S. workers’ leverage and risks another import surge against our mills and machine shops. If Congress ties termination to enforceable Made‑in‑America procurement, anti‑de‑minimis enforcement, and targeted, statutory tariffs that back unions and pensions, I’ll reconsider. Until then: vote no. [5]Reuters — How the United States is eating Trump’s tariffs — Reuters[7]U.S. International Trade Commission — USITC summary of 232 and 301 tariff effec…

Sources cited
  1. [1] S.J.Res. 88 (Text) — Congress.gov Library of Congress
  2. [2] Executive Order 14257 (Apr. 2, 2025) — Federal Register Federal Register
  3. [3] Executive Order 14259 (Apr. 8, 2025) — Federal Register Federal Register
  4. [4] S.J.Res. 88 — All Actions — Congress.gov Library of Congress
  5. [5] How the United States is eating Trump’s tariffs — Reuters Reuters
  6. [6] Amiti, Redding, Weinstein (2019), The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare — NBER National Bureau of Economic Research
  7. [7] USITC summary of 232 and 301 tariff effects (2018–2021) U.S. International Trade Commission
  8. [8] USDA ERS: Retaliatory Tariffs Reduced U.S. States’ Ag Exports USDA ERS
  9. [9] Court finds tariffs an illegal use of emergency power, but leaves them in place — AP Associated Press
  10. [10] Web search · turn 4 #0
  11. [11] 50 U.S.C. § 1622 — National Emergencies Act termination — LII Legal Information Institute (Cornell Law)

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