119-HR-3716 Investigative Journalist Impact Analysis

Summary

The bill compels the Comptroller General (GAO) to report within 60 and 180 days after any systemic risk exception (SRE) determination and requires the failed bank’s primary federal regulator to disclose supervisory materials and analyses within 90 and 210 days, subject to redactions and explicit non‑waiver of privilege/FOIA exemptions. It passed the House on December 1, 2025, and awaits Senate consideration. [2]Library of Congress — Text - H.R.3716 (Reported in House): Systemic Risk Author…[1]Library of Congress — H.R.3716 - Systemic Risk Authority Transparency Act (stat…

Context: the SRE under 12 U.S.C. §1823(c)(4)(G) permits actions beyond least‑cost resolution when necessary to avoid serious adverse effects on financial stability and mandates loss recovery via special assessments. GAO and agency post‑mortems after the March 2023 bank failures spotlighted mismanagement and supervisory shortcomings—issues this bill seeks to illuminate systematically. [3]Cornell Law School — 12 U.S. Code § 1823 - Corporation monies (Systemic Risk Ex…[4]U.S. Government Accountability Office — GAO-25-107023 — Federal Agency Efforts…

Economic Effects

• Direct federal costs: Prior CBO scoring for a substantially similar predecessor (H.R. 4116, 118th Congress) estimated total costs across GAO, FDIC, OCC, and the Federal Reserve at less than $500,000 over 10 years, suggesting de minimis budget impact for H.R. 3716. [5]Library of Congress — H. Rept. 118-614 — Systemic Risk Authority Transparency A…
• Assessment funding context: The SRE triggers industry‑funded loss recovery. FDIC estimates about $16.3 billion of losses were attributable to protecting uninsured depositors in 2023 failures, with roughly 114 banking organizations paying a special assessment (no banks under $5B in assets). Enhanced transparency may improve acceptance and calibration of such assessments. [6]FDIC — FDIC Fact Sheet — Final Rule on Special Assessment Pursuant to Systemic…
• Market discipline: Requiring disclosure of causes, management failings, and supervisory actions could improve pricing of bank risk by investors and counterparties, consistent with supervisory transparency literature indicating benefits for market discipline. [7]European Central Bank — Bank transparency and market efficiency (2025)
• Bank behavior and funding costs: Repeated GAO/agency reporting on SRE events (including compensation practices and uninsured depositor dynamics) could pressure boards to strengthen risk controls; however, disclosures that effectively reveal weaknesses may raise funding costs for riskier institutions—an intended disciplinary effect. [4]U.S. Government Accountability Office — GAO-25-107023 — Federal Agency Efforts…
• Compliance and opportunity costs: Agencies must compile, review, redact, consult, and publish extensive supervisory records on tight timelines, diverting examiner and counsel time during already stressed periods; the bill allows limited deadline extensions to prioritize stability. [2]Library of Congress — Text - H.R.3716 (Reported in House): Systemic Risk Author…
• Liquidity backstops: GAO has documented heavy reliance on Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances and coordination with Federal Reserve liquidity during the 2023 turmoil; mandated reporting should clarify such channels’ roles and costs in future SREs, informing reforms to backstop design. [8]U.S. Government Accountability Office — Federal Home Loan Banks: Actions Relate…

Social Effects

• Depositor confidence and fairness: Public post‑mortems explaining why uninsured deposits were protected and who bears special assessments can bolster perceived fairness and trust in the safety net, especially for payroll‑heavy SMEs that keep balances above insurance limits. [6]FDIC — FDIC Fact Sheet — Final Rule on Special Assessment Pursuant to Systemic…
• Accountability for management and supervisors: Required examination of executive mismanagement, compensation practices, and supervisory shortcomings offers clearer accountability pathways for boards, executives, and regulators—potentially deterring future negligence. [2]Library of Congress — Text - H.R.3716 (Reported in House): Systemic Risk Author…[9]FDIC — FDIC’s Supervision of Signature Bank — Internal Review (April 28, 2023)
• Distributional effects within banking: Transparent recounting of how SRE costs were allocated (e.g., exemption of sub‑$5B banks from the 2023 special assessment) may reduce perceptions that community banks cross‑subsidize large institutions. [6]FDIC — FDIC Fact Sheet — Final Rule on Special Assessment Pursuant to Systemic…

Environmental Effects

No direct environmental impacts are apparent. Any effects are indirect—via macroeconomic conditions influencing credit supply for clean‑energy or environmental projects—and are too attenuated to quantify in connection with this reporting mandate. No specific environmental provisions are included. (No citation warranted.)

Temporal Analysis

1. Immediate (0–12 months after an SRE): Agencies incur marginal administrative costs to compile and redact materials; near‑term market reactions may reflect information about supervisory and management failures revealed in the initial 60/90‑day reports. [2]Library of Congress — Text - H.R.3716 (Reported in House): Systemic Risk Author…
2. Medium term (1–3 years): Patterns from multiple reports could inform supervisory guidance, board practices, and uninsured‑depositor behavior, influencing funding stability and the design of future assessments. [4]U.S. Government Accountability Office — GAO-25-107023 — Federal Agency Efforts…[6]FDIC — FDIC Fact Sheet — Final Rule on Special Assessment Pursuant to Systemic…
3. Long term (3+ years): If reporting improves supervision and governance, frequency and severity of failures requiring SREs may fall, lowering systemic risk externalities; conversely, if disclosures chill candid bank–supervisor dialogue, risk could migrate off‑balance‑sheet or into less supervised corners. [10]U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Information Policy — DOJ Guide to the Fre…

Unintended Consequences

• Selective opacity via redactions: The transparency mandate includes a consultation process and allows withholding where there is a “substantial public interest in not publishing,” creating discretion that could shield embarrassing supervisory lapses or third‑party failures; congressional oversight will need to test the limits of those omissions. [2]Library of Congress — Text - H.R.3716 (Reported in House): Systemic Risk Author…
• Litigation exposure and resource diversion: Expanded publication around SREs may prompt discovery disputes and FOIA challenges, consuming agency legal resources even with privilege preserved. [11]Justia — In re Subpoena Served Upon the Comptroller of the Currency, 967 F.2d 6…
• Signaling effects: Detailed timelines of liquidity support (e.g., FHLB advances, Fed facilities) could be read as playbooks by markets, potentially accelerating outflows in future stress if backstops appear conditional or delayed. [8]U.S. Government Accountability Office — Federal Home Loan Banks: Actions Relate…

Assessment

Overall stance: Neutral. The measure imposes modest federal costs while plausibly improving accountability and market discipline around rare, high‑impact SRE events; yet it also introduces operational and signaling risks inherent in publishing supervisory records, even with privilege and FOIA protections intact. [5]Library of Congress — H. Rept. 118-614 — Systemic Risk Authority Transparency A…[7]European Central Bank — Bank transparency and market efficiency (2025)[10]U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Information Policy — DOJ Guide to the Fre…

Key Metrics

Sources for metrics: deadlines and protections (bill text); losses and assessment scope (FDIC); cost estimate (CBO on H.R. 4116, the closely related predecessor); status (Congress.gov). [2]Library of Congress — Text - H.R.3716 (Reported in House): Systemic Risk Author…[6]FDIC — FDIC Fact Sheet — Final Rule on Special Assessment Pursuant to Systemic…[5]Library of Congress — H. Rept. 118-614 — Systemic Risk Authority Transparency A…[1]Library of Congress — H.R.3716 - Systemic Risk Authority Transparency Act (stat…

Sourcing

Core authorities and analyses referenced above. Citations correspond to specific claims in sections.

• Congress.gov bill page and actions (status as of December 1, 2025). [1]Library of Congress — H.R.3716 - Systemic Risk Authority Transparency Act (stat…
• Bill text (Reported in House) detailing deadlines, scope, redaction/privilege clauses. [2]Library of Congress — Text - H.R.3716 (Reported in House): Systemic Risk Author…
• 12 U.S.C. §1823(c)(4)(G) – systemic risk exception framework. [3]Cornell Law School — 12 U.S. Code § 1823 - Corporation monies (Systemic Risk Ex…
• GAO review of agencies’ systemic risk efforts after 2023 failures. [4]U.S. Government Accountability Office — GAO-25-107023 — Federal Agency Efforts…
• FDIC special‑assessment fact sheet (loss attribution; payers; rate and timing). [6]FDIC — FDIC Fact Sheet — Final Rule on Special Assessment Pursuant to Systemic…
• GAO on FHLB advances and coordination in 2023 turmoil. [8]U.S. Government Accountability Office — Federal Home Loan Banks: Actions Relate…
• FDIC internal review of Signature Bank supervision (management and supervisory failings). [9]FDIC — FDIC’s Supervision of Signature Bank — Internal Review (April 28, 2023)
• DOJ OIP FOIA Guide – Exemption 8 purposes and scope. [10]U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Information Policy — DOJ Guide to the Fre…
• D.C. Circuit on bank‑examination privilege (In re Subpoena). [11]Justia — In re Subpoena Served Upon the Comptroller of the Currency, 967 F.2d 6…
• CBO estimate for predecessor H.R. 4116 (indicative cost magnitude). [5]Library of Congress — H. Rept. 118-614 — Systemic Risk Authority Transparency A…
• House Report 119‑206 (purpose, need, and confidentiality balancing). [12]Library of Congress — H. Rept. 119-206 — Systemic Risk Authority Transparency A…
• ECB research on supervisory transparency and market discipline. [7]European Central Bank — Bank transparency and market efficiency (2025)